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abstract
The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played
an important role in the development of memory research in the last couple
decades. Despite its growing importance in psychology, philosophers have
only begun to develop an interest in philosophical questions pertaining to
the relationship between memory and mental time travel. Thus, this paper
proposes a more systematic discussion of the relationship between memory
and mental time travel from the point of view of philosophy. I start by
discussing some of the motivations to take memory to be a form of mental
time travel. I call the resulting view of memory the mental time travel view.
I then proceed to consider important philosophical questions pertaining to
memory and develop them in the context of the mental time travel view. I
conclude by suggesting that the intersection of the philosophy of memory
and research on mental time travel not only provides new perspectives to
think about traditional philosophical questions, but also new questions that
have not been explored before.
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The idea that episodic memory is a form of mental time travel has played
an important role in the development of memory research in the last cou-
ple decades. Mental time travel, according to Suddendorf and Corballis
(1997), “comprises the mental reconstruction of personal events from the
past (episodic memory) and the mental construction of possible events in
the future" (133). “The real importance of mental time travel", they add,
“applies to travel into the future rather than into the past; that is, we pre-
dominantly stand in the present facing the future rather than looking back
at the past" (Suddendorf and Corballis 1997: 147).
Traditionally, memory has been taken to be primarily about the past, in
the sense that it allows us to recall things that happened. However, the sug-
gestion that episodic memory is just a form of mental time travel challenges
this idea, for “the primary role of mental time travel into the past is to pro-
vide raw material from which to construct and imagine possible futures"
(Suddendorf and Corballis 2007: 302). These considerations raise a num-
ber of important philosophical questions. A first relevant question refers to
whether memory requires an appropriate causal connection to past experi-
ences or events. Since Martin and Deutscher (1966), it has been standard
to assume that remembering requires such connection (see, e.g., Bernecker
2008; Debus 2008; Michaelian 2011; Robins 2016b). A second relevant ques-
tion is whether episodic memory can be a source of knowledge of the past
(see Debus 2014; Michaelian 2016b). Since mental time travel into the past,
or episodic memory, is in the service of providing raw material to simulate
future scenarios, it is not clear whether or under what conditions it can pro-
vide us with reliable information about past happenings. A third and more
general question refers to the relationship between memory and other forms
of mental time travel, such as imagining future events. Because both are a
result of similar cognitive capacities, the question of whether they belong
to the same metaphysical kind becomes central (see Perrin and Michaelian
2017)
These and other questions have attracted attention from philosophers con-
cerned with memory (see, e.g., De Brigard 2014; Debus 2014; Michaelian
2016b; Perrin 2016). In this paper, I will explore some of the implications
that the mental time travel view of memory, as I will refer to it, has to the
philosophy of memory. I will start by discussing some motivations to con-
sider episodic memory as a form of mental time travel. Subsequently, I will
explore the implications of this idea to the philosophy of memory.
2 episodic memory and mental time travel
Before we discuss the relationship between episodic memory and mental
time travel, it will be helpful to first clarify what episodic memory is. The term
was initially introduced by Endel Tulving (1972), and roughly speaking, it
corresponds to the memory system responsible for receiving and storing “in-
formation about temporally dated episodes or events, and temporal-spatial
relations among these events" (385).1 So, when you episodically remember
1 The term memory is ambiguous and it might refer to different things, such as one’s capacity
to remember (e.g., “John has a good memory"), the cognitive system responsible for producing
memories (e.g., “Your memory is not working well"), or the outputs of that cognitive system,
namely the mental states that we call “memories" (e.g., “I have a memory of my tenth birthday
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an event, your memory contains information about the what, the where, and
the when associated with that event. That is the so-called what-when-where
view of episodic memory, or simply the www view. Episodic memories, on
Tulving’s initial formulation, contrast with semantic memories. Those re-
fer to memories about general facts that were not necessarily experienced.
For example, when I remember that the Second World War ended in 1945,
I am semantically remembering a fact by using language. The semantic
memory system, Tulving says, refers to the “organized knowledge a person
possesses about words and other verbal symbols, their meanings and ref-
erents, about relations among them, about rules, formulas, and algorithms
for the manipulation of these symbols, concepts, and relations" (1972: 386).
Thus, in contrast to episodic memories, semantic memories do not require
the previous experience of the relevant events.
The important thing to note about this definition of episodic memory is
that it is primarily based on the kind of information that is processed and
stored. And, because of this, it faces some important problems. One such
problem refers to the fact that some semantic memories possess the relevant
“www" information; for example, my memory that the Waterloo battle was
fought in 1815. Thus, it is not entirely clear whether episodic memories and
semantic memories can be distinguished solely on the basis of the informa-
tion possessed by them. Another problem refers to the phenomenological
dimension of episodic memories. Remembering a particular event that was
previously experienced seems to involve more than the retrieval of informa-
tion. Episodically remembering seems to have a distinctive phenomenology,
involving a "feeling of pastness" (Russell 1921: 161–62) and a "feeling of
warmth and intimacy" (James 1890). In other words, besides the informa-
tion carried, episodic memories seem to make reference to the past ("feeling
of pastness") and to belong to subjects in a unique way ("feeling of warmth
and intimacy"). For example, when I remember my tenth birthday party,
the memory not only presents the event as having occurred in the past, but
also as being "mine", in the sense that I seem to own the memory.
These and other difficulties have led Tulving to reformulate his first char-
acterization of episodic memory. Later on, he proposed a definition that
took into account the phenomenological aspects described above. Accord-
ing to him, besides carrying “www" information, episodic memories involve
a unique kind of consciousness, which he called autonoetic consciousness or
simply autonoesis (see Tulving 1985, 2005). Autonoesis, Tulving says, “refers
to the kind of conscious awareness that characterizes conscious recollection
of personal happenings"; that is, it is what makes subjects “aware that the
present experience is related to the past experience in a way that no other
kind of experience is" (Tulving 2005: 15).2
The definition of episodic memory as involving autonoesis is very im-
portant. Because “[t]he act of remembering [...] is characterized by a dis-
party"). For my purposes, I use the term to refer both to the cognitive system responsible for
producing memories as well as to the individual mental states produced by it.
2 Although initially characterized in phenomenological terms, there is no agreement as to what
autonoesis is exactly. Some have argued, for instance, that autonoesis has an important epis-
temic value. For example, Dokic (2001; 2014) holds that episodic memory carries a “feeling
of knowing", in the sense that it tells subjects that it originates in their past experiences. Fer-
nández (2016) defends a similar view, but he builds autonoesis into the content of memory
rather than in its phenomenology. Quite recently, Mahr and Csibra (2017) have proposed a
"communicative" account of the function of episodic memory, in which autonoesis is viewed as
being responsible for "[delineating] which of our claims about the past we can assert epistemic
authority". Despite these important developments, I shall take for granted the more standard
idea that autonoesis is mainly a phenomenological feature of episodic memory.
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tinctive, unique awareness of reexperiencing here and now something that
happened before, at another time and in another place" (Tulving 1993: 68),
remembering makes subjects “capable of mental time travel: [...] [a] person
can transport at will into the personal past, as well as into the future" (67,
my emphasis). So, besides being responsible for the unique feeling asso-
ciated with episodic memories, autonoesis gives subjects a more general
capacity to “travel" in subjective time. This is not difficult to motivate on
phenomenological grounds. As Klein (2015) notes, there is a “perceived
temporal symmetry between movements toward (future) and away (past)
from the present" (21). To illustrate, imagine that you are thinking about
your holidays at the beach next year. Similarly to episodic memories, you
have the feeling that the thought is owned by you, in the sense that the
holidays are yours and not someone’s else. However, because the event is
something that can happen, it is presented to you as being “future" to your
current thought. Thus, it looks like we can “relocate" ourselves to the future
in the same way that we can do it in relation to the past.
The capacity endowed to us by autonoesis to travel both to past subjec-
tive time and to future subjective time consists in an important motivation to
take episodic memory to be just one form — among others — of mental time
travel. Despite giving emphasis to phenomenological considerations above,
there are also good empirical reasons to endorse this view. In a recent survey,
Perrin and Michaelian (2017) discuss similarities between episodic memory
and future mental time travel found in different domains. In developmen-
tal studies, for example, it has been shown that the children’s capacity to
remember the past and imagine the future arise at approximately the same
time (Suddendorf and Busby 2005; Atance 2008; Fivush 2011). In studies
with patients with memory impairments, it has been found that deficits in
memory incur in similar deficits in the ability to think about future scenar-
ios (Klein et al. 2002; Rosenbaum et al. 2005; Hassabis et al. 2007). Moreover,
imaging studies also show that there is a strong overlap in the brain regions
associated with episodic memory and future mental time travel (Addis et al.
2007; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012).
I will not attempt to review the relevant literature here.3 I shall, instead,
point out to an important development of the mental time travel view of mem-
ory. More recently, some researchers have suggested that the primary func-
tion of mental time travel is not to allow us to remember the past. Sudden-
dorf and Corballis (1997), for example, argue that “[t]he real importance of
mental time travel applies to travel into the future rather than into the past;
that is, we predominantly stand in the present facing the future rather than
looking back at the past" (147). In a similar spirit, De Brigard (2014) says
that “remembering is a particular operation of a cognitive system that per-
mits the flexible recombination of different components of encoded traces
into representations of possible past events [...] in the service of construct-
ing mental simulations of possible future events” (158, my emphasis). And,
more recently, Michaelian (2016b) says that “remembering is not different in
kind from other episodic constructive processes" (103), thus “[w]hat it is for
a subject to remember [...] is for him to imagine an episode belonging to his
personal past" (111).
The idea that the primary function of mental time travel is not to remem-
ber the past, but to imagine the future, has important consequences. One
such consequence is that our common sense conception of memory, accord-
ing to which memory’s function is to store information of what happened,
3 For a detailed review concerned with philosophical questions, see Perrin and Michaelian (2017).
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seems to be threatened. It is compatible with the mental time travel view
that our representations of the past be inaccurate as long as they are ben-
eficial for future actions. So, as De Brigard (2014) notes, “many ordinary
cases of misremembering should not be seen as instances of memory’s mal-
function" (158, his emphasis). This raises a further question, which is of
particular interest to philosophers, about whether, and if so, how, memory
provides knowledge of the past. Because the primary function of remember-
ing is not to recover information about the past, we need a proper account
of how knowledge can be formed on the basis of memory. Similarly, the
mental time travel view poses important questions pertaining to the relation-
ship between memories and the past events. The causal theory of memory,
which has been predominant in philosophy for the past four decades, stip-
ulates that remembering requires the preservation of an appropriate causal
connection to past events. However, if memory is a form of mental time
travel in the same way that imagination is, and “if imagining need not draw
on stored information ultimately originating in experience of the relevant
episode" (Michaelian 2016b: 111), there is no principled reason to say that
such requirement holds for memory.
In summary, the mental time travel view of memory raises a lot of impor-
tant questions for philosophers concerned with memory. In an attempt to
motivate those problems, I will consider, in the next section, some implica-
tions that the mental time travel view of memory has to the philosophy of
memory.
3 mental time travel and the philosophyof memory
The mental time travel view of memory not only challenges important tra-
ditional conceptions about memory, but also offer prospects for future re-
search on the subject. In this section, I will consider some topics that are
of potential interest to philosophers of memory concerning the mental time
travel view of memory. However, because the interest of philosophers on
these topics is still very recent, there is not a lot of works dealing systemat-
ically with the questions that I discuss below. For this reason, rather than
attempting to survey the debate, I will try to motivate some problems of
potential interest.
3.1 The causal theory of memory
After the publication of Martin and Deutscher’s seminal paper “Remem-
bering" (1966), philosophers in the analytic tradition started to develop an
increasing interest in philosophical questions pertaining to memory. Martin
and Deutscher proposed what is now known as the causal theory of memory
(CTM). The CTM has been very influential and it still shapes, to a large ex-
tent, how philosophers think about memory today.4 However, if correct, the
mental time travel view raises important concerns about the CTM.
The CTM provides us with a set of criteria to determine whether a given
mental state counts as remembering or not. For the CTM, a subject S counts
as remembering an event e iff:
4 For a recent and comprehensive assessment of the CTM in relation to recent developments in
the philosophy of memory, see Michaelian and Robins (201x).
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1. S represented e in the past; (Past representation condition)
2. S has a current mental representation of e; (Current representation con-
dition)
3. The content of the current mental representation of e is sufficiently
similar to the content of the past representation of e; (Content condition)
4. There is an appropriate causal connection between the current rep-
resentation of e and the past representation of e. (Causal connection
condition)5
To clarify these points, consider my putative memory of my tenth birthday
party. In order for me to count as remembering this event, I need to have
experienced it previously. That is the past representation condition. Addition-
ally, I need to be able to represent the same event in the present. That is the
current representation condition. But my past and current representations can
only be representations of the same event if their contents are sufficiently
similar (the content condition); for example, if the contents of both represen-
tations contain members of my family and friends, a chocolate cake, etc.6
Finally, remembering requires that my current representation of my tenth
birthday be caused, in an appropriate way, by my past representation of the
same event (the causal connection condition). The requirement for such causal
connection consists in the main novelty of the CTM. Moreover, since it is
also the source of the problems that arise in the context of the mental time
travel view of memory, I will focus on it more closely.
The causal condition is supposed to rule out cases that, intuitively, we
do not count as remembering, but that are allowed by (1)–(3). To see this,
consider the case of Kent described by Martin and Deutscher (1966):
A man whom we shall call Kent is in a car accident and sees
particular details of it, because of his special position. Later on,
Kent is involved in another accident in which he gets a severe
blow on the head as a result of which he forgets a certain section
of his own history, including the first accident. He can no longer
fulfill the first criterion for memory of the first accident. Some
time after this second accident, a popular and rather irrespon-
sible hypnotist gives a show. He hypnotizes a large number of
people, and suggests to them that they will believe that they had
been in a car accident at a certain time and place. The hypno-
tist has never heard a thing about Kent nor the details of Kent’s
accident, and it is by sheer coincidence that the time, place, and
details which he provides are just as they were in Kent’s first
accident. Kent is one of the group which is hypnotized. The sug-
gestion works and [...] [Kent] believes firmly that he has been in
5 This discussion is adapted from Bernecker (2010, ch. 1). See also Bernecker (2015, 302).
6 Martin and Deutscher (1966) conceive of this similarity in terms of a structural analogy holding
between the past representation and the current representation. They say that “the past expe-
rience must constitute a structural analogue of the thing remembered, to the extent to which he
can accurately represent the thing" (191, my emphasis). It is not entirely clear, however, where
the structural analogy is to be found. The most natural interpretation seems to be that the
content of the past representation must have the same kind of structure as the content of the
current representation, but they do not say anything as to what the structure of those contents
are supposed to be. Another issue is that it is not clear how much “structural analogy" is
required for S to count as remembering. While we do not want to require the content of the
past representation to be the same as the content of the current representation, it is hard to find
a principled way to determine how much similarity is required. For my purposes, I shall put
these worries aside. For a related discussion, see Michaelian (2011) and Michaelian (2016b, 90).
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an accident. The accident as he believes it to be is just like the
first one in which he was really involved. (174)
Kent’s case satisfies (1) and (2) above, as he had a past representation of the
car accident and has a current representation of the same event. Moreover,
it satisfies (3) too, for Kent’s current representation is sufficiently similar to
his past representation. Nevertheless, it seems wrong to say that Kent is gen-
uinely remembering. The reason is that his current representation does not
preserve the right kind of causal connection to his past representation. To
use Martin and Deutscher’s (1966) term, the past representation is not “oper-
ative" in producing the current representation. In Kent’s case, the operative
cause, so to speak, is the hypnotist. For the CTM, then, remembering is not
only a matter of getting the details of a past experience of an event right,
but also of standing in an appropriate causal relation to that experience.
Besides offering a way to rule out cases not contemplated by (1)–(3), the
causal connection condition has also been used to provide a taxonomy of
memory. As it stands, the CTM is an answer to the general question of
what it takes for a subject to remember. However, there are more than one
way in which one can successfully or unsuccessfully remember something,
which requires an account of those differences. For example, it is consistent
with remembering my tenth birthday party that I get some of its details
wrong.7 I can correctly remember that my whole family was there and that
the party took place at a certain location, but I can simultaneously remem-
ber, incorrectly, that I had strawberry cake. In this case, we can say that I am
misremembering my tenth birthday party. Thus, Sarah Robins (2016b) has re-
cently argued that, given the constructive character of memory (see Bartlett
1995; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; Michaelian 2011; De Brigard 2014), we need
to appeal to a causal connection between past and current representations
to distinguish remembering from misremembering.8 In a similar spirit, Ber-
necker (2017) has suggested that one can only distinguish between success-
ful remembering from confabulations (see Hirstein 2005) if one requires that
the former, but not the latter, preserves a causal connection to past experi-
ences (see also Robins 2016b, 201x). The causal connection, therefore, is not
only important to provide an adequate analysis of remembering, but also of
the different kinds of successful and unsuccessful remembering.
The mental time travel of view of memory challenges the central status
given to the causal connection condition in a theory of memory. As I dis-
cussed above, on the mental time travel view, the primary function of mem-
ory is not to remember the past (see Suddendorf and Corballis 1997; De
Brigard 2014; Michaelian 2016b). But, if that is the case, then it is hard to see
why we should endorse the CTM. There are multiple reasons to think this.
One reason is that, as Michaelian (2016b, 111) notes, because other forms of
mental time travel need not have such causal connection to past experiences,
there is no principled way to require it in the case of memory. This does not
mean, of course, that there cannot be such connection, but only that it is not
necessary.
Another reason is that, from the perspective of the mental time travel
view, straightforward occurrences of remembering would be ruled out by
the CTM. The causal connection allows us to preserve the intuition that,
in cases such as Kent’s, subjects do not count as remembering. However,
7 Although, again, how much inaccuracy is consistent with remembering is not entirely clear.
See Michaelian (2011) and note 6.
8 See Michaelian (2016a) for a critique of Robins’s proposal and an attempt to provide a taxon-
omy of memory that abandons the causal connection altogether.
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intuitively we do not seem to require that all occurrences of remembering
preserve an appropriate causal connection to past events. Consider the fol-
lowing case. Imagine that I experienced my tenth birthday party in the past
and that I now have a putative memory of it. I remember my friends and
family being there and I remember having chocolate cake. However, sup-
pose that my current representation is not being caused by my previous
representation of my tenth birthday party, but rather by two different expe-
riences that involved the relevant elements of my current representation. In
this case, the content of my current representation is partly derived from,
say, my experience of my ninth birthday party, which was attended by the
same individuals, and partly derived from my experience of another party
that I attended, where there was a chocolate cake. In this case, there is no
causal connection of the sort required by the CTM, but it seems too stringent
to say that the subject is not remembering the relevant event only because
the content of his current representation is not derived from the content of
the original experience.9
A third reason why the mental time travel view challenges the CTM is
that the latter is incompatible with the constructive character of mental time
travel. Because mental time travel is in the service of simulating events to
assist subjects in future interactions with the environment, it seems too re-
strictive to require that our representations of the past have to draw content
from only one singular source. For example, in thinking about how I should
act in my job interview next week, my current representation of the past will
benefit more from drawing on different past experiences of job interviews
than drawing on only one singular experience.10
In sum, the CTM has occupied a central position in philosophical theoriz-
ing about memory for the past fifty years. Besides providing an analysis of
remembering that accounts for a wide range of cases, it provides a useful
principle to conceive of a taxonomy of remembering. However, if the mental
time travel view of memory is right, the centrality of the CTM might not be
warranted.
3.2 Mental time travel and our knowledge of the past
One direct consequence of abandoning the causal condition can be seen in
the epistemology of memory. Because the causal condition is no longer
necessary to remember, there is no guarantee that the content of our current
representations derive from the content of our past representations. That
being the case, the question that poses itself is whether, and if so, how,
we can form knowledge of what happened in the past on the basis of our
current representations. Is mental time travel capable of providing such
knowledge? Before I turn to this question, it is important to distinguish
between two senses in which it can be asked. On the one hand, we can ask
the pragmatic question of whether memory provides us with information
that, in practical contexts, allows for useful inferences about how things
9 One might argue here that, intuitively, the case above does not count as a straightforward
occurrence of remembering rightly because there is no causal connection. I do not mean to
dispute people’s intuitions about this and other similar cases, but, as long as we want our
intuitions to be compatible with what empirical research tells us about memory, this seems
the most plausible way to describe them. In other words, given the constructive character of
memory (see, e.g., Bartlett 1995; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012; Michaelian 2011; De Brigard 2014),
it is not unlikely that cases as the one described above can happen.
10 See, however, Sutton (1998) and Michaelian (2011) for different attempts to provide a causal
view compatible with the constructive character of memory. For a related discussion, see
Robins (2016a; 2016b).
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were in the past. Call this the pragmatic epistemic question. On the other
hand, we can ask whether memory actually provides knowledge of the past,
in the sense that it serves as grounds for our justified beliefs about it. Call
this the strict epistemic question.
This distinction is important because a positive answer to the pragmatic
epistemic question does not necessarily give us a positive answer to the strict
epistemic question. It might be the case that the content of my memory
of my tenth birthday party is the same or very similar to the content of
the memories that other people have of this event, such that I can make
useful inferences about the event in relevant contexts, but it does not follow
from this that my memory allows me to know anything about this event.
An answer to the strict epistemic question, in contrast, requires identifying
what makes it possible that our current memories serve as grounds for our
justified beliefs about the past.
The causal condition provides an answer to the strict epistemic question.
Because the content of my current representation of an event is caused by
my past representation of it, the causal connection makes it possible for
memory to ground our knowledge of the past. Otherwise put, the beliefs
that we form on the basis of memory are justified because there is an ap-
propriate causal connection between memories and past events. However,
if, as the mental time travel view suggests, this condition is not necessary
for remembering, how can we explain the relationship between the content
of our past and current representations?
It is not entirely clear what the alternative for defenders of the mental
time travel view are here. In fact, because he is the most systematic critic
of the causal condition, Michaelian (2016b) has been the only one so far
to provide an explicit treatment of the question. His approach consists in
adopting a broad reliabilist framework in epistemology, according to which
“the epistemic status of a belief is determined by the reliability of the process
that produced it" (Michaelian 2016b: 39, see also Goldman 2012). Roughly,
the idea is that one is justified in holding a certain belief if that belief was
produced by a reliable process. On Michaelian’s proposal, then, we can
explain why memory serves as grounds for forming knowledge of the past
in terms of the reliability of its underlying processes. This solution, however,
will not be appealing if one is not already inclined to a form of reliabilism.
The reason is that, as Michaelian (2016b, 40) recognizes, it takes reliabilism
as a starting point and then proceeds to explain how memory is reliable.
However, if one is skeptical of the idea that reliability itself can provide an
account of epistemic justification, an account of how memory is reliable will
not suffice to address the strict epistemic question.
The question of whether reliabilism is a good account of epistemic jus-
tification is beyond my scope here. However, given the question at hand
about how memory can form knowledge about the past, it might be useful
to explore other alternatives. One possible approach might be to adopt an
eternalist view of events (e.g., Bernecker 2008). According to eternalism, past
events do not cease to exist when they become past. Eternalism is promis-
ing because it allows one to say that past events are constitutive parts of
memories. To see this, consider an analogy with perception. Relationalists
about perception claim that mid-sized objects are constitutive parts of per-
ception, in the sense that I could not have a visual experience of the chair in
my office if this object were not there (see, e.g., Campbell 2002; Martin 2004;
Brewer 2007; Fish 2009). An important motivation for acknowledging the
constitutive role played by objects in perception is that it allows one to ex-
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plain how they ground our knowledge of the world (see Schellenberg 2016
for a recent discussion). Similarly, it might be argued, acknowledging the
constitutive role played by past events in memories allows one to explain
how they ground our knowledge of the past.11
Eternalism faces important problems. It is not obvious, for example, how
our memories can be constituted by events located in a different spatiotem-
poral location. While it makes room, at least in principle, for that relation
to take place by recognizing the existence of past events, an account of how
they relate to our current mental representations is still required. The prob-
lem is that it is hard to see how such an account would look like. Another
problem for eternalism is that it requires us to pay a high metaphysical price
to account for how remembering grounds our knowledge of the past. Be-
cause we are required to postulate the existence of past events, some might
view this solution with skepticism (e.g., Michaelian 2016b, 63).
Another alternative, which I shall call the pragmatist solution, is to deny
that the pragmatic epistemic question is different from the strict epistemic
question. On such view, having knowledge about the past is simply a mat-
ter of making useful inferences about how things were back then. Whether
or not we have knowledge of the past, the pragmatist will say, depends
on how our memories can inform our future behavior. If memories allow
for behaviors that lead to coordinated action with other individuals in rele-
vant settings, such as discussing who attended your birthday party, or more
primitively, discussing where food can be found, then that is all that is re-
quired to say that we have knowledge of the past. The pragmatist will
deny, therefore, that there needs to be, necessarily, a causal connection to
past representations, as long as the current representations allow for useful
inferences about the past.
The pragmatist solution also faces important problems. The first problem
is similar to the one raised above to reliabilism. In other words, it will only
look appealing for those who are already inclined to a pragmatist view in
epistemology. The second problem is that the pragmatist solution seems
arbitrary, in the sense that it seems to imply that our knowledge of the past
depends on what certain individuals "agree" to be the case. However, it
is not clear who the relevant individuals are in each situation, or even if
there is a principled way to identify them. Moreover, the focus on useful-
ness might lead to counterintuitive results, for a memory might be useful
to guide the current behavior of different individuals without being true of
the past. In other words, it is completely plausible that subjects might mis-
remember some or all details of an event in a similar way, such that their
memory reports agree with each other, but nonetheless fail to effectively
describe what happened.
To conclude this part, it seems that an account of how we form knowledge
of the past according to the mental time travel view might require some
controversial commitments. While these commitments might take place at
different domains — e.g., in metaphysics, as in the eternalist solution, or in
epistemology, as in the reliabilist and the pragmatist solutions — a convinc-
ing answer to this question will inevitably require a proper motivation of
those commitments.
11 Debus (2008) makes the exact same point when she claims that “the Relational Account [of
memory] must be true if we accept (as we should) that people can sometimes gain knowledge
about the past on the basis of their [memories]" (406–7). However, her account of memory
requires postulating a fundamental separation between memory and other forms of mental
time travel view, which makes her view unpromising here (see Debus 2014 and section 3.4).
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3.3 The objects of mental time travel
The mental time travel view of memory also raises important questions
about the objects of mental time travel. If memory is only one form of
mental time travel, then an account of the objects of memory will inevitably
depend on a more general account of the objects of mental time travel. Tradi-
tionally, philosophers have addressed the question of the objects of memory
in quite some detail. Inspired by Hume (2011) and Locke (1975), represen-
tational or indirect realist views hold that the objects of memory are internal
representations of events (see, e.g., Russell 1921; Byrne 2010). Relational or
direct realist views, in contrast, say that the objects of memory are the past
events themselves (see, e.g., Reid 2000; Laird 2014; Russell 2001; Debus 2008).
Given this framework, one natural suggestion here to address the question
of the objects of mental time travel would be to take one’s preferred account
of the objects of memory and apply it to mental time travel. However, this
seems to get things backwards. On the mental time travel view of memory,
the mental time travel category is more basic than the category of memory,
so we first need an account of the objects of mental time travel, which will
only then inform our account of the objects of memory.
The question of the objects of mental time travel has not been addressed
in the literature so far. So, there are no established views about it. How-
ever, this should not prevent us from thinking about what an answer to the
question might look like. One way to start addressing it is to distinguish
between different forms of mental time travel. Although this is not always
made explicit in discussions on the subject, there are more than one way in
which mental time travel into the past and into the future can happen. Be-
sides episodic memory, which refers to mental time travel to past events that
occurred, and episodic future thinking, which refers to mental time travel to
events that might occur, we also think about counterfactual events located
in subjective time (see De Brigard 2014). For example, I can think about
how my life would be right now if I had not gone to college. In this case, I
am thinking about an event that could have happened in the past, and that
would influence the present, but that is no longer possible. Similarly, I can
think about how my life will be in ten years if I had not gone to college. In
this case, I am thinking about an event that would be the case in the future
if some other event in my past had been different. In both cases, then, I am
entertaining thoughts about counterfactual situations oriented to the past
and to the future.
The above suggests that an account of the objects of mental time travel
needs to take into account not only episodic memory and episodic future
thinking, but also forms of episodic counterfactual thought (see De Brigard
2014) directed to the past and to the future. This makes the initial ques-
tion significantly harder, for now we have to explain how things that can
no longer be the case can somehow be the objects of our thoughts. One
promising line of investigation might be to appeal to the notion of intentional
objects. Intentional objects, as originally introduced by Brentano (2014), are
non-existent objects which are the direct objects of awareness of the mind.
Although this is a promising line, no one has pursued it systematically as
of yet.12
Another alternative might be to look at the traditional accounts of the
objects of memory as starting points. While relational views have been de-
12 See, however, Crane (2001; 2013) for potentially helpful discussions about intentional objects in
philosophy of mind.
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fended more consistently in the context of memory, they do not seem to
offer promising prospects for a more general account of the objects of men-
tal time travel. The reason is that the objects of mental time travel, except
for arguably the objects of memory, do not exist, which makes it impossible
for us to be related to them. So, unless one is willing to commit to more
controversial metaphysical views, such as the view that there are intentional
objects (e.g., Crane 2001, 2013) or some form of modal realism (Lewis 1986),
it is not clear whether relational views can be coherently sustained. In con-
trast, representational views might be more promising. Because the objects
that are represented by mental time travel need not exist to be represented,
there is no need to worry about the metaphysical status of those events.
What is relevant to explain how we are aware of the relevant events are the
existence of the representations, which would serve as proxies for the events.
It is not clear, however, what the problems for a representational account of
the objects of mental time travel would be. Since this question has not been
explored in enough detail, it remains to be seen whether representational-
ism can stand up to a more detailed analysis.
3.4 The metaphysics of mental time travel
The consideration of the questions above finally leaves us in a position to
consider a more general question about the metaphysics of mental time
travel. As we saw, the mental time travel view of memory raises a lot of
different issues regarding the epistemology and the metaphysics of memory.
But how pressing those questions are will depend on how one sees the
category of memory in relation to the broader category of mental time travel.
Until now, I have taken for granted that there are good reasons to accept that
memory is just another occurrence of mental time travel. However, some
philosophers have resisted this view. Debus (2014), for example, argues that
memory and future future-oriented mental time travel — or what she calls
sensory imagination — are occurrences of different kinds because there are
important metaphysical dissimilarities between them.
The debate about the metaphysics of mental time travel is still very re-
cent and, as with some of the other questions above, there are not well-
established views in the literature. Despite this fact, I will follow Perrin and
Michaelian (2017) here and distinguish between continuist and discontinuist
metaphysical views of mental time travel. Continuists accept that the simi-
larities between memory and other forms of mental time travel support the
more general view that they are occurrences of the same kind. Discontinu-
its, in contrast, say that those similarities are not enough to say that memory
and other forms of mental time travel are occurrences of the same kind.
Reasons for endorsing continuism vary. The general motivation, though,
seems to stem from different strands of research in the empirical sciences.
As I discussed in section 2, there is a great variety of empirical work that
highlight important similarities between episodic memory and mental time
travel. Perhaps the most distinctive motivation comes from the fact that
mental time travel into the past and mental time travel into the future draw
on very similar cognitive resources, which suggests that a common or “core"
cognitive mechanism responsible for mental time travel will be eventually
identified (Addis et al. 2007; Schacter et al. 2007, 2012). In more philosoph-
ical terms, then, we can see continuism as relying on a more naturalistic
stance towards the question of the relationship between episodic memory
and mental time travel. In other words, for continuists views, because there
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is a lot of different empirical evidence suggesting that episodic memory is
just another occurrence of mental time travel, we should take this evidence
seriously when thinking about the metaphysics of mental time travel.
Discontinuist views, in contrast, seem to be motivated by more general
a priori considerations about the metaphysics of mental time travel. This
is not to say, of course, that discontinuists simply ignore the empirical ev-
idence on which continuism relies.13 Instead, they believe that other con-
siderations, such as whether mental time travel establishes an appropriate
causal connection to the events in question, are also important to provide an
appropriate picture of the metaphysics of mental time travel. Debus (2014),
for example, argues that episodic memory and other forms of mental time
travel are occurrences of two fundamentally distinct kinds.14 To support this
claim, she says that, unlike episodic memory, other forms of mental time
travel fail to put subjects in an experiential relationship with the relevant
events. The notion of an experiential relationship is a technical one, which
refers to the causal and spatiotemporal relationship that subjects have to the
events that their thoughts are about. In episodic memory, this relationship
obtains because the relevant events occurred and we can, at least potentially,
draw the causal connection between the current memory and the past event.
In other forms of mental time travel, in contrast, the relationship does not
obtain because the relevant events do not exist.
Besides reflecting different metaphilosophical attitudes towards the same
question, the dispute between continuism and discontinuism reflect differ-
ent commitments taken in relation to the questions discussed in previous
sections. Consider the question of whether episodic memory requires an
appropriate causal connection to past events. While continuism is compati-
ble with the CTM, it does not give the causal connection condition a central
place in its metaphysical theorizing of mental time travel. For continuism,
the presence (or the absence of) a causal connection reflects, at best, only
a difference of degree between episodic memory and other occurrences of
mental time travel. For discontinuists, however, this question is central for
the metaphysics of mental time travel. The presence (or the absence of) a
causal connection is sufficient to separate two mental occurrences as being
of two different kinds.
The same applies to the question of our knowledge of the past and the
objects of mental time travel. For continuists, like Michaelian (2016b), a
proper account of how episodic memory provides us with knowledge of
the past can be given by looking at the reliability of the mechanisms that
produce memories, which, in turn, do not require causal connections to
the past. Thus, the things that make us aware of the past events are the
internal representations, which are detachable from those events. In this
sense, continuists might be more inclined to adopt a representational view
of the objects of mental time travel. For discontinuists, in contrast, episodic
memory is capable of providing subjects with knowledge in a way that
other forms of mental time travel cannot. This is because it puts us in a
relationship to past events, which necessarily involves a causal connection
to them, that is not possible by means of other forms of mental time travel.
Thus, discontinuists might not be satisfied with a representational view of
13 See, for example, Perrin (2016) for a more modest discontinuist view that takes into account
the similarities highlighted by empirical research.
14 Debus discusses only the relationship between episodic memory and future-oriented thinking,
or sensory imagination as she calls it. However, since her argument seems to suggest that other
forms of mental time travel are equally distinct from episodic memory, I shall not make this
distinction here.
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the objects of mental time travel, as representations of events can occur in
the absence of causal connections to the relevant events. A direct realist
or relational view of memory (see Debus 2008) will, therefore, seem more
appealing for discontinuists, which Debus (2014) recognizes to be central to
her discontinuist account.
4 conclusion
The view that memory is a form of mental time travel offers exciting prospects
for new research in the emerging sub-field of the philosophy of memory.
Traditional views of memory, such as the causal theory of memory, and
traditional questions about memory, such as how it provides knowledge of
the past and what is the nature of its objects, need to be reconsidered in
the broader framework of mental time travel. These questions, however, are
inter-related with more general and new questions that arise only in the
context of the research on mental time travel, i.e., what the objects of mental
time travel are and what is the metaphysical status of those mental states.
Thus, the intersection of the philosophy of memory and research on mental
time travel not only provides new perspectives to think about traditional
questions, but also new questions that have not been explored before.
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